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I-DNA-FICATION, PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE
ERIC T. JUENGST, PH.D.*
INTRODUCTION
On March 1, 1999, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno asked the
National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence to assess the
legality of collecting DNA samples from everyone arrested by the
police, and of banking the individually identifying genetic information
they contain for future law enforcement use. This request came on
the heels of the inauguration in October 1998 of the FBI's national
electronic database of "DNA fingerprints" taken from convicted
criminals by forensic laboratories in all fifty states.1 That initiative, in
turn, had been underway ever since the value of DNA profiles as
uniquely identifying personal traits was first demonstrated in 1985.2
In the interim, the collection of DNA for personal identification
purposes has already become mandatory within the military,3 and has
become a mainstay of civilian efforts to clarify the identities of
children,4 kidnap victims,5 family lineages6 and even religious relics.7
On the horizon lies the question that civil libertarians anticipate with
dread: why not store personally identifying genetic information on
everyone as a matter of course, for the advances in public safety and
* Associate Professor of Biomedical Ethics, Center for Biomedical Ethics, School of
Medicine, Case Western Reserve University. Ancestral versions of this paper have been
presented at the Arizona State University Center for Law, Science and Technology and the
International Symposium on Forensic Science. I am grateful to Mark Rothstein and Lori
Andrews for helpful commentary on its drafts.
1. See Russ Hoyle, The FBI's National DNA Database, 16 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
987, 987 (1998).
2. See A.J. Jeffreys et al., Individual-Specific "Fingerprints" of Human DNA, 316
NATURE 76, 76 (1985).
3. See Robert Craig Sherer, Note, Mandatory Genetic Dogtags and the Fourth
Amendment: The Need for a New Post-Skinner Test, 85 GEo. L.J. 2007, 2010-11 (1997).
4. Cf. CONGRESS OF THE U.S., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC
WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS (1990).
5. Cf ERIC STOVER & GILLES PERESS, THE GRAVES: SREBRENICA AND VUKOVAR
(1998).
6. See Don Terry, DNA Results Confirmed Old News About Jefferson, Blacks Say,
N.Y.TIMES. Nov. 10, 1998, at A18, A18.
7. Cf GILBERT R. LAVOIE, UNLOCKING THE SECRETS OF THE SHROUD (1998).
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personal security that can be gained thereby?
Photographs and traditional fingerprints have, of course, also
been taken, collected, and used for all these same purposes in the
past. But unlike photography and manual fingerprinting, 8 collecting
individually identifying DNA patterns ("IDNAfication" for short)
does involve taking bits of people's bodies from them: nucleated cells
and their complements of DNA molecules. For those concerned
about the ethical and legal status of our body tissues and our ability to
control what happens to us through them, this corporeal side of
iDNAfication raises an interesting challenge. Clearly, questions of
personal privacy are involved. But unlike most other disputes over
body tissues, the issues here are not primarily matters of personal
sovereignty.
For example, unlike involuntary sterilization or forced surgeries,
the central concern with mandatory iDNAfication does not seem to
be the violation of a person's bodily integrity. Compared with the
other infringements of personal freedom that legitimately accompany
legal arrest, providing a saliva or cheek swab sample seems negligibly
invasive.9 Moreover, unlike the creation of marketable human cell
lines or the commercialization of organ procurement, it is not the
exploitation or misappropriation of the person's body for others' gain
that is centrally troubling either. Manual fingerprints and
photographs also exploit suspects' bodies in order to incriminate
them without raising special privacy concerns. 10 Moreover, consider
the fact that it does not matter to an identical twin whether a DNA
sample under scrutiny actually comes from him or his sibling; to the
extent that the genetic information it contains describes both their
bodies, the privacy of each is endangered.
In fact, the major moral concern about iDNAfication has little to
do with whether the DNA analyzed is "a piece of" the person being
identified, "the property of" the person being identified, or even is
"forcibly extracted from" the person being identified. In most
8. What does one call traditional fingerprinting to distinguish it from DNA typing?
"Digital fingerprinting" is confusing, since the DNA profiles themselves are "digitized"
representations of DNA marker patterns. "Phalangeal fingerprinting" sounds redundant. I will
use "manual fingerprinting," because it both takes impression from hands and still must be done
by hand.
9. Cf. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reasons for Doubt: Legal Issues in the Use of DNA
Identification Techniques, in DNA ON TRIAL: GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 19 (Paul R. Billings ed., 1992).
10. Cf Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (distinguishing between self-
incriminating testimony and physical evidence).
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iDNAfication contexts, these "physical," "proprietary," and
"decisional" privacy considerations are beside the point." Rather, the
important feature of iDNAfication is what the DNA analyzed can
disclose about the person being identified. It is, in other words,
individuals' "informational privacy" that is at stake in the prospect of
widespread iDNAfication, and it is in those terms that the policy
challenge of iDNAfication should be framed. What should society be
allowed to learn about its citizens in the course of attempting to
identify them?
Taking up this challenge does mean taking seriously the
precedents set by society's use of photography and manual
fingerprinting, since their primary impact on personal privacy also lies
in the identifying information they record rather than the nature of
their acquisition. If the collection of mandatory "mug shots" and
fingerprint impressions are taken as benchmarks of social acceptance
for at least some identification purposes, any iDNAfication methods
that conveyed no more personal information than those techniques
should also be socially acceptable for at least the same range of
purposes. Thus, where we now legitimately take fingerprints of
arrestees, inmates, employees and recruits, we should be justified in
performing iDNAfication if its informational privacy risks were
equivalent. Similarly, if we accept the personal disclosures involved
in using photographs on drivers' licenses and identification cards, we
should be willing, in theory, to expose an equivalent range of genetic
information in any legitimate forms of iDNAfication. One approach
to the general challenge of iDNAfication, then, would be to ask the
following question: if we accept the ways in which photographs and
manual fingerprints are used for legitimate identification purposes
today, under what circumstances, if any, might forms of iDNAfication
meet the standard those practices set for the disclosure of personal
information?
My goal in this essay is to review the privacy issues surrounding
iDNAfication in terms of this focal policy question. In the next
section, I briefly reiterate two relevant points many others have made
about existing iDNAfication programs: (1) to approximate the
intrusiveness of traditional fingerprinting, any DNA taken for
identification purposes should only be typed for information-free
11. See Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC
SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 33 (Mark
A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (distinguishing between the four senses of privacy referred to here).
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markers; and (2) no physical DNA samples should be banked. The
second point is the contentious one, of course, but critical to the issue
at hand. Then, in the following section, I raise what seem to me to be
the primary social policy considerations that could distinguish
iDNAfication from other techniques: our society's commitment to
equality of opportunity in the face of the persistence of racism, on
one hand, and our commitment to a presumption of innocence for the
targets of criminal investigation, on the other. As I try to show, both
commitments could be endangered by widespread use of
iDNAfication unless two rules can be enforced: (1) identifying DNA
profiles should be accessible to criminal investigations only for those
individuals already convicted of crimes, and (2) no markers
conferring differential advantages by "race" should be tolerated. In
the last section, I summarize my analysis by making nine
recommendations for general iDNAfication principles. These
recommendations might provide the basis for our social response to
invitations, like Attorney General Reno's, to consider the widespread
use of iDNAfication technologies for the larger social good.
I. PERSONAL PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS
Most of the personal privacy risks of iDNAfication have already
been described by others and anticipated in the design of some
iDNAfication programs. For example, many have pointed out that, if
the DNA sequences used as the components of iDNAfication profile
are taken from the regions of the human genome that code for
proteins, important biological information about their sources could
be revealed, including information about their paternity, current
health status, and potential health risks. 12  Any risk of disclosing
sensitive personal information of these sorts would clearly increase
the intrusiveness of iDNAfication beyond that of traditional
fingerprinting and photography. In addition, it could expose the
person being described to the possibility of being discriminated
against on the basis of a disclosed genotype. 3 Fortunately, this is a
12. Cf CONGRESS OF THE U.S., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at
98-101 (discussing the use, advantages, criticisms and limitations of using DNA evidence in
criminal investigations and civil paternity cases). See generally COMMITTEE ON DNA TECH. IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE ET AL., DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992) (discussing the
collection and use of DNA profiles in the legal system).
13. See, e.g., Philip L. Bereano, DNA Identification Systems: Social Policy and Civil
Liberties Concerns, 1 INT'L J. BIOETHICS 146, 151 (1990) (discussing "genetic redlining," defined
as discrimination based on genetic screening); Andrea de Gorgey, The Advent of DNA
Databanks: Implications for Information Privacy, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 381, 396 (1990). Cf
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privacy risk that can be almost entirely eliminated by two simple
precautions: (1) avoid analyzing biologically informative DNA, and
(2) destroy the DNA samples upon analysis.
The first precaution can be accomplished by restricting the
sections of DNA that are amplified, analyzed and utilized in the
iDNAfication profile to the noncoding regions of DNA between our
functional genes. By definition, markers selected from these regions
will not disclose any biologically significant information. Rather, like
fingerprints, they could merely provide a unique pattern to match in
seeking to identify an unknown person. Even photographs are useful
mainly as patterns to match, rather than for what they can
independently tell us about the person pictured in them.
Serendipitously, individual variation is also vastly more pronounced
in this so-called "junk" DNA (since mutations can accumulate in
these sections without having any adverse effect on genomic
function), making it more attractive for iDNAfication purposes on
scientific ground as well.
Thus, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI"), in
establishing standardized forensic iDNAfication markers for use by
state laboratories contributing DNA profiles to the Bureau's National
DNA Index System, has focused on a set of thirteen loci from
noncoding regions that contain series of repeated nucleotide
sequences whose length is highly variable between individuals: either
"variable number of tandem repeat" sites or "short tandem repeats"
sites, depending on the analytic method used. 14 The exclusive use of
these markers in any iDNAfication program would forestall most
genetic privacy concerns linked to the biological information content
of DNA profile itself. Since other marker systems that do involve
coding regions from both nuclear and mitochondrial DNA have been
used for forensic iDNAfication purposes in the past,'15 and, as I will
American Soc'y of Human Genetics, Ad Hoc Comm. on Individual Identification by DNA
Analysis, Individual Identification by DNA Analysis: Points to Consider, 46 AM. J. HUM.
GENETICS 631 (1990) (stressing the importance of confidentiality in DNA databanks); Barry
Scheck, DNA Data Banking: A Cautionary Tale, 54 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 931, 932-33 (1994)
(discussing the potential for controversial use of DNA databanks such as for research studies on
the genetic makeup of certain kinds of criminal offenders).
14. See Hoyle, supra note 1, at 987 (stating that "DNA law also sharply limits DNA
identification technology to 13 basic probes that can isolate genetic characteristics, but are
unable to provide fuller details of identity").
15. Cf. Randall S. Murch & Bruce Budowle, Are Developments in Forensic Applications of
DNA Technology Consistent with Privacy Protections?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 212,224 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997)
(acknowledging use of coding region markers for forensic analysis).
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suggest below, others may become very attractive to law enforcement
officials in the future, one important prerequisite to meeting the
existing "pattern matching" standard would be to strictly limit the DNA
profiles generated by any iDNAfication program to uninformative
noncoding regions.
The second important step to insuring the genetic privacy of
iDNAfication is to destroy the physical samples of DNA once DNA
profiles have been generated from them. As long as the DNA
samples themselves are retained, the risk remains that they could be
retested for their biological informational content. Thus, in its report
on forensic DNA analysis, the National Academy of Sciences in 1990
recommended that even samples taken from convicted offenders be
destroyed "promptly" upon analysis, 16 and the FBI has designed its
national iDNAfication collection as a databank, not a DNA bank,
including only the electronic profiles of noncoding DNA markers. 7
Unfortunately, this second precaution has not been adopted by
forensic laboratories at the state level or by the military at the federal
level. Most of these laboratories continue to plan to bank their actual
DNA samples indefinitely, on the grounds that the samples may need
to be retested as new markers or testing technologies become
standard.18 The U.S. Department of Defense is storing dried blood
samples from its recruits for genotyping only in the event that the
recruits later turn up missing in combat. This effectively undercuts
the privacy protections afforded by using noncoding markers in the
iDNAfication profile itself and immediately elevates the privacy risk
of any iDNAfication program well beyond that of ordinary
fingerprinting. Even if, contra the National Academy of Sciences, this
increased risk were tolerable for convicted offenders, it should not be
for military recruits, government employees, or arrestees, since the
potential intrusion goes well beyond what is required for
identification.
This suggests another important prerequisite for any wider uses
of iDNAfication. In order to be acceptable, any proposal for
iDNAfication should include the requirement for immediate post-
typing sample destruction. In effect, the price of adding new markers
to the typing repertoire may be the need to re-sample the available
16. COMMITrEE ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCES ET AL., supra note 12, at 122.
17. See Murch & Budowle, supra note 15, at 226-27 (describing the FBI's National DNA
Index System).
18. See Jean McEwen, Forensic DNA Data Banking by State Crime Laboratories, 56 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 1487, 1490-91 (1995).
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eligible population -a hurdle that may also serve as a useful brake on
any undue proliferation of markers and provide a periodic occasion
for taking stock of the collections.
II. SOCIAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the initial hopes of early enthusiasts like Francis Galton,
large collections of ordinary fingerprints have never been useful for
much else besides individual identification.1" As a result, little debate
exists over the risks or benefits of "versatility" as a feature of
ordinary fingerprint collections. The informational potential of the
human genome, however, does require the designers of iDNAfication
systems to consider in advance the range of uses they should
accommodate. Even when a DNA profile collection is committed
exclusively to use for "personal identification purposes," several
policy choices present themselves. (1) Should the system be designed
to support any type of research involving the stored information? (2)
Should the system be designed to aid in the identification of the
sources of new DNA samples without clear matches in the database?
(3) Should the system be designed to support electronic "dragnet"
screening of the population in search of particular individuals? In the
context of the expanding uses of iDNAfication, these choices raise
some important social policy issues that go well beyond issues of
personal privacy.
A. Research Uses
Among the legislatively authorized uses of the existing
iDNAfication databanks are their use for various kinds of research.
For example, many state statutes, following the FBI's legislative
guidelines, provide for the use of convicted offender iDNAfication
data in research by state forensic scientists designed to improve
iDNAfication techniques and protocols.20 Although the state statutes
vary widely in the security procedures they mandate for containing
this research within the crime laboratories and protecting the
identities of the sample sources, implementing the protections
19. Francis Galton hoped that the analysis of fingerprints would reveal the behavioral
predispositions, personality types, or, at the very least, the ethnic and racial identities of those
who left them. See Paul Rabinow, Galton's Regret: Of Types and Individuals, in DNA ON
TRIAL: GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5,7 (Paul R. Billings ed., 1992).
20. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-18-3 (1994).
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recommended by the FBI21 would raise few direct privacy issues.
However, it is worth noting that to the extent that this research
requires access to physical DNA samples, it provides the main
impetus for retaining samples in state crime labs after the database
profiles have been generated. Moreover, to the extent that this
research is successful, it will be the main source of new typing
markers and techniques, and an engine of change within an
iDNAfication system. In that light, it may be worth recommending
that, just as we do in medical genetics, the research engine be revved,
monitored and tuned "out of gear" in experimental settings before
being engaged and applied to practice. In this case, for instance, that
might mean establishing a research collection of DNA samples
separately from the iDNAfication collection based on voluntary
contributions from informed sources in the normal manner of
biomedical genotyping research. This would both enhance the
legitimacy of the research enterprise and allow the iDNAfication
collection to enjoy the protection of destroying its samples after
typing them.
Of course, far from adopting biomedical standards for forensic
research, some states already go too far in the other direction by
allowing biomedical research to be conducted as if it were forensic
work. For example, Alabama allows the use of anonymous DNA
samples from its convicted offender collection "[t]o provide data
relative to the causation, detection and prevention of disease or
disability" and "[t]o assist in other humanitarian endeavors including,
but, not limited to, educational research or medical research or
development. ' 2  First of all, again, this provision clearly assumes that
Alabama will be banking physical DNA samples, which is
problematic in itself, as I've suggested above. Secondly, Alabama's
generosity towards researchers is presumably premised on the view
that the "anonymity" of the samples provides adequate protection of
the sources' privacy, and frees the state from having to worry about
the usual elements of biomedical research like informed consent. But
on the contrary, from the perspective of research ethics, these
samples are not anonymous, or even "anonymized," since the
iDNAfication database is itself the key to identifying the source of
any given sample. Since that existing linkage makes it technically
21. See Murch & Budowle, supra note 15, at 219-22 (describing security precautions for
forensic DNA collections).
22. ALA. CODE § 36-18-3.
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possible to benefit and harm the sample donors with the results of
such research, all the usual biomedical research protections should
apply.23 Moreover, if access to the database is opened as widely as the
range of research authorized in Alabama suggests, there is another
risk from which sample anonymity offers no protection: the risk of
being discovered to be a convicted criminal by any "researcher" who
already knows your genetic identity and finds you in the database. 24
In addition to these personal privacy issues, moreover, open-
ended research on iDNAfication samples also poses broader
questions of research justice. Collections of DNA samples from
criminals or soldiers, for example, are likely to be perceived as
particularly rich research resources by those interested in studying
genetic factors involved in anti-social or aggressive behavior.
Unfortunately, our social experience with such research has not been
good.25 Repeatedly, such studies have succumbed to ascertainment
biases that ultimately mischaracterize-and stigmatize -groups of
people that are disproportionately represented in the systems under
study for social reasons.26
Two forms of injustice tend to flow from these results.27  First,
genetic claims about individual research subjects, like those
concerning "XYY syndrome" in the 1970s, become generalized to an
entire class, simultaneously pathologizing behavior and stigmatizing
23. See American Soc'y of Human Genetics, ASHG Report: Statement on Informed
Consent for Genetic Research, 59 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 471, 471 (1996); see also American
College of Med. Genetics Storage of Genetic Materials Comm., A CMG Statement: Statement on
Storage and Use of Genetic Materials, 57 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1499, 1499 (1995) (containing
recommendations on what a patient should be informed about when providing DNA samples);
Ellen Wright Clayton et. al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored Tissue Samples,
274 JAMA 1786, 1786 (1995) (containing "recommendations for securing appropriate informed
consent when collecting tissue samples for possible use in genetic research and for defining
indications for additional consent if samples in hand are to be used for genetic studies"); Robert
F. Weir & Jay R. Horton, DNA Banking and Informed Consent-Part 2, IRB: A REVIEW OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS RES., Sept.-Dec., 1995, at 1, 1 (analyzing and comparing the content of
various consent documents used for DNA banking).
24. Imagine a clever employer, like a University Department of Forensic Science, who is
concerned about promoting anyone with a criminal conviction. If the candidates' DNA profiles
can be voluntarily acquired ("a student project"), and an adequate "research" proposal
concocted, the Department could scan the state database in search of its promotion
candidates-something it could not do (legally) with the state's criminal fingerprint files.
25. See generally BIOLOGY, CRIME AND ETHICS: A STUDY OF BIOLOGICAL
EXPLANATIONS FOR CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (Frank H. Marsh & Janet Katz eds., 1985).
26. See TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 96-109 (1990) (discussing the biases of
ascertainment in criminality studies).
27. See David Wasserman, Science and Social Harm: Genetic Research into Crime and
Violence, 15 REP. FROM INST. FOR PHIL. & PUB. POL'Y 14, 15-16 (1995).
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bearers of the genetic trait.28 This has the effect of both undercutting
personal responsibility29 and legitimizing draconian "medical"
responses to the targeted behavior, like eugenic sterilization.0
Second, like the old eugenic studies3 and the new MAOA studies,32
genetic studies tend to misdirect attention from the overwhelming
social causes of the behaviors they purport to explain by encouraging
a determinism that suggests that efforts at social reform are ultimately
futile. Where this misdirection reinforces existing social policy
inequities, it is likely to have an even more pronounced effect.33
Of course, this problem should not come up in practice; to meet
the "pattern matching" standard, all research that requires examining
any actual genes should have already been ruled out for
iDNAfication programs by the privacy protections described above.
Indeed, I raise this issue mainly to illustrate a point-that the
generation of genetic information, even anonymized and aggregated
genetic information, can carry collective risks for groups that can
settle on the shoulders of their individual members to their detriment.
If one goal of social justice is to prevent mere group membership
from imposing undeserved social burdens on individuals, the
collective impact of any new generator of genetic information should
be part of its risk assessment.
Finally, almost all states also allow their convicted offender
iDNAfication databases to be used anonymously for the generation
of population polymorphism frequency statistics.34 These statistics are
used as the background against which the significance of any
28. See A. Freyne & A. O'Connor, XYY Genotype and Crime: 2 Cases, 32 MED. SC. & L.
261, 261-62 (1992).
29. See generally Maureen P. Coffey, Note, The Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation?,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 353, 353-99 (1993) (examining criminal responsibility in light of
scientific data in the area of genetics).
30. See generally PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF
INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1991) (discussing the heritability of
sexual deviance, eugenics and critic of involuntary sterilization).
31. See generally J. DAVID SMITH, THE EUGENIC ASSAULT ON AMERICA (1993)
(discussing eugenics and race).
32. See Charles Mann, Behavioral Genetics in Transition, 264 SCIENCE 1686, 1688-89 (1994)
(discussing a study on monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) from which some researchers inferred
the existence of a relation between the gene that codes for the activity of MAOA and aggressive
behavior and the implications of the study).
33. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of
Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1992) (exploring the relation between "biological
assumptions," the "concept of personhood" and notions of law and justice).
34. See generally Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, A Review of State Legislation on
DNA Forensic Data Banking, 54 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 941 (1994) (documenting statutes
allowing research access to anonymized data).
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particular database match is measured. In the initial (British) DNA
fingerprinting studies, they were calculated for the general population
as a whole, a strategy that assumed that the different variants of the
multiple markers used were randomly distributed throughout the
population.35 Critics of this strategy argued that the U.S. population,
at least, is significantly segregated into multiple, largely endogamous
sub-populations and that lumping them together for analysis would
have the effect of artificially exaggerating the statistical uniqueness of
any particular profile by diluting the relative frequency of that profile
in the subpopulation with its relative rarity in other subpopulations. 36
To account for the lack of random mating in our population, the
critics argued that detailed genetic variation studies of the population
along ethnic and geographical lines were required.37 Others argued,
however, that the statistical benefits of attempting to extensively
subdivide the population are minimal for forensic purposes, and are
quickly outweighed by the logistical and conceptual problems
involved. 3 8 Instead, the FBI now uses a simplified scheme of "readily
apparent" population reference groups, consisting of "major
population groups" like "African Americans" and "Caucasians" and
"geopolitical groups" like "Hispanics." 39
Of course, it is obvious that these reference groups correspond to
the same traditional and problematic racial categories that have been
so often misused in our society in the past and underlie so much of
this country's efforts to achieve and ensure equality of opportunity
for its citizens. Should the continued use of these categories as
reference groups for iDNAfication population frequency data be a
cause for concern?
In responding to their critics, defenders of the FBI's use of racial
categories as genetic reference groups make an argument that is
helpful to appreciate. They point out that further ethnic specification
is impractical in law enforcement contexts because ethnicity is not
35. See generally Jeffreys et al., supra note 2 (discussing the initial British DNA studies).
36. See generally Joel E. Cohen, DNA Fingerprinting for Forensic Identification: Potential
Effects on Data Interpretation of Subpopulation Heterogeneity and Band Number Variability, 46
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 358 (1990).
37. See R.C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartd, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing,
254 SCIENCE 1745, 1745 (1991).
38. See Bruce Budowle et al., Reliability of Statistical Estimates in Forensic DNA Typing, in
DNA ON TRIAL: GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 79, 80 (Paul R. Billings
ed.. 1992); see also Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in
Forensic Work, 254 SCIENCE 1735, 1738-39 (1991).
39. See Murch & Budowle, supra note 15, at 219.
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always readily apparent and becomes dependent too quickly on the
suspect's self-description to be reliable. Moreover, they argue, the
statistical differences that ethnic specification would yield, while
meaningful to a population historian or genetic epidemiologist, are
insignificant in the courtroom setting. To suggest that they were
significant, in fact, might produce an unhealthy biological segregation
of ethnic populations that could promote inter-group discrimination. 40
On the other hand, the argument goes, it is empirically
demonstrable that most Americans do marry within their socially-
identified "race," so that more endogamy and thus greater allele
frequency variation can be expected among groups defined in those
terms. From this perspective, using racial categories as reference
classes, and sorting profiles into those racial categories in the process
of building population statistic databases is not to attribute any
special biological reality to race; it merely reflects the influence of
racism on our country's current population marriage patterns.
In any case, they conclude, even the major reference classes are
of little forensic significance due to the extensive overlap between
them. In the end, the FBI advocates assessing any given match
against all the reference groups, and letting the triers of fact-juries
and judges-decide which is most relevant to use in a given case.41
This is a persuasive argument, but perhaps it proves too much; in
the end it cuts against their own position as well as their critics'. For
example, consider their concern about the ambiguity of "ethnicity,"
and the risk of discrepancies between a suspect's self-identified social
ethnicity and his genetic ancestry. In fact, despite the rigidity of the
social boundaries we create with racial designations, both social
scientific research 4 and population genetic research 43 suggest that
these groups are much less endogamous-much less group-like, from
the genetic perspective-than we generally acknowledge. It may be
possible to isolate some polymorphisms that, in today's population,
are more frequently found in one socially defined group than in
another. But they will also always be linked to others that span the
40. See generally Eric T. Juengst, Group Identity and Human Diversity: Keeping Biology
Straight from Culture, 63 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 673 (1998) (discussing the implications of
studies into the genetic differences of human groups).
41. See Budowle et al., supra note 38, at 88.
42. See generally, e.g., VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION (1986) (discussing
the social construction of personal racial identities).
43. See, e.g., JONATHAN MARKS, HUMAN BIODIVERSITY: GENES, RACES, AND HISTORY
273-75 (1995).
[Vol. 75:61
1999] I-DNA-FICA TION, PERSONAL PRIVACY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 73
groups, and their frequencies will change within the fluctuating social
boundaries of the groups from one generation to the next. Moreover,
if the statistical differences between these groups are insignificant
enough to make selecting the appropriate reference group a social
judgment call rather than a matter of science, are they differences
that we should let make a difference? After all, in most contexts we
do decry, as part of the injustice of racism, the use of social criteria
like the "One Drop Rule" to assign people to racial categories that
work to their disadvantage. 44 Perhaps as a corrective to that risk, the
choice of relevant reference group should be left open not to the
triers of fact, but to the sample donors themselves, to give them the
opportunity to use the group that works best to their advantage.
On the other hand, in other forums, such as insurance
underwriting, we have made policy decisions to blind the "triers of
fact" (actuaries in this case) to statistical differences in mortality and
morbidity between socially defined racial groups, even where those
differences are actuarially significant. As a matter of justice, we resist
being saddled with the burden of generalizations about groups to
which we just happen to (involuntarily) belong. By the same token,
even where the polymorphism frequencies between "races" are
statistically significant, it seems like a form of discrimination to let
those generalized differences influence the outcome of particular
cases. Given what we know about the plasticity of "race" and the
dangers of perpetuating it as a social discriminator, neither the
advantages nor the disadvantages that its use can afford in the
courtroom, the university admissions office or the personnel
department seem justified.
On these social justice grounds, then, we should be careful to
develop iDNAfication tools only in the context of background
polymorphism frequency data that are not organized against socially
defined racial categories. The price of this recommendation would be
the loss of some degrees of statistical resolution in assessing match
significance; but it will be a loss across the racial board. Moreover, if
less subpopulation sensitive markers can be developed and used, it
may not be a loss that will make that much practical difference to the
"triers of fact."
44. See generally DOMINGUEZ, supra note 42 (on the history of the "one drop rule" for
determining "Negro" racial status).
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B. Profiling Uses
The third kind of databank that is part of a comprehensive
iDNAfication system (in addition to the identified DNA profile
collection and the aggregate population polymorphism frequencies
database) is an open case file: a collection of DNA profiles taken
from crime scenes or battlefields or plane crash sites that come from
as yet unidentified sources. Obviously, this collection needs to be
comparable to the identified reference collection, which means the
same markers should be used to compose the profiles in both. With
these collections, however, investigators will be especially pulled to
glean as much information as they can from their genetic analyses in
their efforts to compose a profile of their missing sample source.
One of the areas of highest interest has been in noncoding
polymorphisms that would allow investigators to estimate the "ethnic
affiliation" of a sample source. A recent article captures the spirit of
this effort, and some of its internal tensions, in its conclusion:
Although ethnic affiliation is often clearly evident on gross
observation, many of the traits that allow these distinctions are
superficial. Ethnic classification is much more difficult when one
has only skeletal remains or a sample of blood to examine. This is
primarily due to the facts that human populations share a very
recent common ancestry and that the majority of the total genetic
variation is due to differences within populations and not to
differences between them.... Additionally, the large-scale
hybridization or admixture of populations that has occurred in the
United States has acted to obscure the genetic differences among
resident populations. Despite these factors, we have shown that it is
possible to identify a collection of genetic markers that are
distinctive enough to allow confident genetic EAE [ethnic
affiliation estimations] .... In addition, it may prove feasible to
estimate individual admixture concurrent with EAE, so that
interethnic individuals, first- or second- generation hybrids of one
or more populations, could be identified and classified
appropriately. 45
These investigators call their markers "population specific alleles" or
"PSAs," and the ethnic populations they mark are, once again, just
our traditional "races:" "European-Americans," "African-
Americans," "native Americans," and "Asian Americans."
Should these PSAs be included in or excluded from the panel of
markers established for our universal, "humanitarian" iDNAfication
45. Mark D. Shriver et al., Ethnic-Affiliation Estimation by Use of Population-Specific
DNA Markers, 60 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 957, 962-63 (1997).
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system? Including them would allow the system to support an open
case file that could take advantage of the additional information to
narrow the search for sample sources. It would also, presumably,
take the guesswork out of deciding against which racial reference
group to assess a particular sample.
Of course, including PSAs in iDNAfication profiles would
elevate the informational content of the profile beyond that of a
traditional fingerprint, constituting more of an intrusion on privacy.
Moreover, it would do so by reporting a particularly socially sensitive
feature of the arrestee: his probable race. But "mug shot"
photographs also can reveal race, and we sanction collecting them for
identification purposes. How would this be different?
Photography is an illuminating analogy here. Photographs show
only the superficial distinctions that we use socially to categorize a
person's ethnic affiliation. They leave that categorization itself up to
the "gross observer," and make no claims about its merits. Thanks to
our "large-scale hybridization," in other words, passing for one race
or another is still possible in mug shots. PSAs, on the other hand, are
defined in terms of our society's racial categories, and purport to be
able to "appropriately classify" even interethnic individuals into their
true (ancestral) categories.
This has several implications. First, it does mean that genuine
secrets might be revealed through PSA screening. For example, shifts
in the social ("racial") status of the arrestee or her ancestors that have
nothing to do with her arrest, but which, if interpreted as normative,
could cause psychological and social harm to the individual and her
families by upsetting her social identity. In that sense, PSAs are more
threatening to privacy than photographs. Second, as the author's own
hopes for "appropriately classifying" hybrids shows, it is hard not to
make the logical mistake of moving from the use of social categories
to define the PSAs to then using PSAs to define our social categories.
This mistake is a dangerous one from a social policy perspective,
however, for two reasons.
First, it risks exacerbating racism by reinventing in statistical and
molecular terms the arbitrary social apparatus of the "blood
quantum" and the "One Drop Rule." Under PSA screening, one's
proportional racial endowment could be quantified, and carrying the
defining polymorphisms for any given race would warrant
(statistically) affiliating one with it for official identification purposes
regardless of one's superficial social identity. In the wake of a
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program of iDNAfication in which thousands of Americans would
have their PSAs determined, this could have powerful social
consequences. For example, consider this January 1996 news flash
from the PSA research world:
An extremely rare mutation on the Y chromosome may be a
genetic marker that is unique to the people who first migrated to
the Americas some 30,000 years ago, researchers report. A group
of Stanford University researchers have identified a mutation that
in their sample [of "500 DNA samples from populations around the
world"] exists only in Indian populations in North and South
America and in Eskimo groups.... [Tihe Y chromosome mutation
occurred in a stretch of DNA that is not related to a gene, but is
part of "junk" DNA that separates the genes. 46
Would it be tolerable to allow this PSA to be used as a sufficient
condition for membership in Native American groups? Would it be
fair for an American man to use a positive test for this PSA in
supporting a claim to affirmative action benefits? 7 Anthropologists
already report that "[i]ronically, in trying to protect their political
sovereignty, some U.S. Indian groups have seized upon the notion of
blood quantum as a way of defining citizenship and protecting their
sovereignty. '48 Conversely, to the extent that anti-indigenous
prejudice still animates the policies of some countries in this
hemisphere, might a detectable genetic hallmark like this PSA serve
as an indelible (if statistical) "yellow star," marking those with
indigenous American ancestry for oppression? The capacity for both
inclusive and exclusive uses of this "ethnic affiliation" marker already
exists in forensic genotyping labs throughout our hemisphere.
In fact, our bad experiences with other forms of "low tech" racial
profiling in law enforcement 49 have already lead to debates in the
courts on whether these practices are unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause.5 0 If PSAs were used forensically to limit
investigations to suspects of a single social "race," they would be
vulnerable on the same grounds.
46. Paul Recer, Genetic Marker of First Migrants, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 14, 1996, at
5-F, 5-F.
47. See generally Arthur L. Caplan, Handle with Care: Race, Class and Genetics, in JUSTICE
AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 30 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lapp6 eds.. 1994)
(discussing the relationship between genetic discoveries and social policies).
48. John H. Moore, Native Americans, Scientists, and the HGDP, CULTURAL SURVIVAL,
Summer 1996, at 60, 62.
49. See generally, e.g., Erika L. Johnson, "A Menace to Society:" The Use of Criminal
Profiles and Its Effects on Black Males, 38 How. L.J. 629, 629-64 (1995) (examining the use of
criminal profiles and its discriminatory impact and legal implications).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077,1081 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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The second danger in estimating ethnic affiliation through PSAs
is the way it facilitates the reification of (fundamentally unjust) social
categories as biological realities. If PSAs are not "genes for race,"
they are at least differentially associated with the people we classify in
particular races. Genetic association, however, in the public and
scientific mind, often comes to imply causation, which implies in turn
the objective reality of the effect. In other words, if PSAs "travel"
with racially defined populations, they must be linked somehow with
the defining genes of those populations; and if the racial populations
have defining genes, races must be real and separable biological
entities, not just social constructions.
Our society has had recurrent experience with this kind of
"hardening of the categories," all of which has been detrimental to
the least well off.5 This is because this kind of thinking fosters a
particular form of social harm: the erosion of our sense of solidarity
as a community and our empathy for members of other groups,
leading to what one scholar has called social policies "moral
abandonment. 5 2  Any widespread iDNAfication program that
involved PSA-based "ethnic affiliation estimations" would run the
real risk of exacerbating that harm, by fostering the public perception
that PSA-based "ethnic affiliation estimations" revealed real "races"
and racial assignments. The problem would only be compounded if
such specialized profiles were also evaluated against a backdrop of
reference groups also defined in terms of social perceptions of race. 3
There is no reason to drive technological wedges into the social
cracks that already divide us if we can avoid it. Thus, an important
requirement for any iDNAfication program should be that, in
recognition of the subjectivity of racial categories and the social
harms that they facilitate, any iDNAfication program should exclude
the use of markers defined in terms of and aimed at identifying
membership in terms of our societal notions of race.
51. See generally, e.g., Troy Duster, Genetics, Race, and Crime: Recurring Seduction to a
False Precision, in DNA ON TRIAL: GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 129
(Paul R. Billings ed., 1992) (discussing the connections between race, crime, genetics and
ethnicity); JOHN S. HALLER, JR., OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF
RACIAL INFERIORITY, 1859-1900 (1971) (exploring how the science of the time helped to
rationalize the theory of racial inferiority in America); EDWARD J. LARSON, SEX, RACE, AND
SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH (1995) (discussing sterilization to prevent certain
inferior portions of the population from reproducing in the historical "Deep South").
52. See Wasserman. supra note 27, at 16-18.
53. See Paul Rabinow, Galton's Regret: Of Types and Individuals, in DNA ON TRIAL:
GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5, 14-16 (Paul R. Billings ed., 1992).
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C. Dragnet Uses
Finally, there is a third set of choices about the range of use to
which any arrestee iDNAfication system should be put. Given our
commitment to the presumption of innocence, should such a system
accommodate "sweep searches" of its stored profiles in the pursuit of
a criminal suspect? Obviously, in addition to the precise
identification of sample sources, the principal purpose of the existing
convicted offender iDNAfication databanks in law enforcement is to
aid in the identification of suspects by matching unidentified DNA
samples from a crime scene with an identified profile in the
collection.5 4 If in fact we kept the informational content of arrestee
iDNAfication under the pattern-matching standard of manual
fingerprinting, could we really complain about police searches of
arrestee iDNAfication databases for the same purpose?
On one hand, it is clear that some dragnet uses of iDNAfication
would not be acceptable in the United States. Critics of current
forensic iDNAfication programs often point to the 1987 British case,
in which every male resident in three Leicestershire villages was
asked to voluntarily provide DNA samples to the police in an
(ultimately successful) effort to identify a murderer, as an cautionary
sign of things to come. 5 However, given the coercive nature of such a
request (police made house calls on those failing to appear for
sampling), its effect of shifting the presumption of innocence to one
of guilt, its lack of adequate probable cause, and the U.S. Supreme
Court's rejection of similar uses of manual fingerprinting, 6 it seems
implausible that such a sampling practice would be considered
constitutionally sanctioned in the United States. Concerns that
"courts will allow testing of everyone in the vicinity of crime" on the
grounds that "[i]nnocent people will have nothing to fear, '57 are
overblown under today's legal system.
However, what if the dragnet were only a matter of searching a
database of DNA profiles previously collected by the state for the
54. See, e.g., DNA Identification Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3) (1994) (on the legitimate
uses of the NDIS).
55. See generally JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLOODING (1989) (discussing the "world's
first murder case to be resolved by 'genetic fingerprinting"')(author's note).
56. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969) (holding warrantless fingerprinting
based on racial profile to be unconstitutional).
57. Eric Lander, DNA Fingerprinting. Science, Law, and the Ultimate Identifier, in THE
CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECr 191, 209-
10 (Daniel J. Kevles & LeRoy Hood eds., 1992).
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identification of arrestees? In supporting the existing convicted
offender iDNAfication databases, the courts have argued that the
public interest in prosecuting crime outweighs any right of privacy
that criminals may have in future cases, thus justifying the reuse of
their DNA fingerprints for forensic matching.58 Moreover, we do
already store and re-use arrest photographs and manual fingerprints,
even from those arrestees subsequently cleared of their charges in
attempting to identify suspects in future cases. Why should arrestee
DNA fingerprints be handled differently?
Here is where the uniquely biological side of iDNAfication re-
enters the analysis, with its increased claims of physical privacy. U.S.
courts have ruled that systematic analyses of tissue samples and body
products (as opposed to photos and fingerprints) of unconvicted
suspects (as opposed to convicted criminals) are the sorts of searches
that are protected by the Fourth Amendment, even when the samples
are already in the state's hands.5 9 This suggests that, although one's
arrest presumes enough probable cause to justify sampling for
identification purposes, arrestees have not forfeited as much of their
presumption of innocence and the physical privacy that attends it as
convicted offenders have, whose samples can be searched at will by
the state. If these decisions are accepted as precedents for
iDNAfication, efforts to screen forensic DNA against a database of
arrestee profiles from unconvicted citizens would also have to pass
the Fourth Amendment's tests and show probable cause for each
attempted match.
Moreover, if anything, the bar to dragnet searches of arrestee
iDNAfication collections should be set higher than the bar to
searching other tissue samples and body products because DNA
profile matching actually poses a greater risk to privacy than other
forms of tissue typing. This is because, unlike both fingerprint and
urinalysis screening, the process of matching a forensic sample against
an iDNAfication database can reveal familial relationships as well as
identities. Unlike fingerprints and photographs, in which the
environmental vagaries of human development usually work to
58. See generally, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 763 F. Supp 842 (W.D. Va. 1991), rev'd in part, 962
F.2d 302 (4" Cir. 1992) (holding that the plaintiffs' "limited interest in not providing a blood
sample is outweighed by the very important interest of the State in deterring and detecting
recidivist acts").
59. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (stating that the
compelled collection of urine samples from students was a "search" triggering the protection of
the Fourth Amendment).
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obscure any convincing evidence of kinship, DNA profiles can
demonstrate those relationships in clear genetic terms.
Thus, when noncoding nuclear DNA markers are used to profile
a forensic specimen, the siblings, parents, and children of the
specimen source will all show partial matches with the specimen.
Their appearance in an arrestee iDNAfication database will not make
them direct suspects because of the mismatching elements of the
profile. But their matching elements can reveal that they are related
to the suspect, and so will flag their family for further investigation by
the police.
Moreover, when mitochondrial DNA is used for genotyping, the
resulting profiles will almost always be completely shared by the
DNA source's mother and siblings, and by her mother and all her
siblings as well. They are all essentially mitochondrial clones. In
these cases, the appearance of these family members in an arrestee
database might even make them immediate suspects for investigation.
In any case, the disclosure of the identities of a suspect's relatives
is not something that fingerprint searches accomplish, which means
that iDNAfication puts more personal information at risk. It,
therefore, poses a greater threat to the privacy of both the arrestees
and their kin. Moreover, experience from clinical DNA testing within
families demonstrates that even in a supportive context, the
disclosure of familial relationships can have tremendous psychosocial
impact on family members.6° To have those relationships disclosed
publicly in the context of a criminal investigation only amplifies the
risk that that impact will be negative on both the sample sources and
their kin.
It is interesting to note in this regard that some states' convicted
offender iDNAfication databanking statutes already include
provisions mandating the expungement of a person's DNA profile,
and the destruction of their samples, if their convictions are
overturned or dismissed on appeal.61 The only circumstance in which
this happens with traditional fingerprints is in case of juvenile
acquittals, where expungement is justified in terms of the burden of
an early criminal record on the life prospects of the acquitted. This
60. Cf. Paula R. Winter et al., Notification of a Family History of Breast Cancer: Issues of
Privacy and Confidentiality, 66 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 1 (1996) (discussing privacy and social
issues arising from notifying an individual of a family history of breast cancer).
61. See generally Jean E. McEwen & Philip R. Reilly, A Review of State Legislation on
DNA Forensic Data Banking, 54 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 941 (1994) (documenting
expungement policies in state statutes).
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suggests that having one's DNA on file with the state is also
recognized, at least in some states, to carry privacy risks to the
individual that are unfair to impose on citizens cleared of criminal
guilt in the same way it is unfair to impose a criminal record on a
reformed youth. But if that is true of those whose convictions are
overturned, it should be equally true for those who are never
convicted in the first place.
This suggests a final important prerequisite for our widespread
iDNAfication program: in order to respect the presumed innocence
and personal privacy of unconvicted individuals, any prospective
investigatory use of iDNAfication collections should be limited to
samples from those who have already forfeited their relevant privacy
rights through conviction. Of course, one consequence of this
recommendation is a relative loss in the program's power to help
prosecute crime, which law enforcement officials may regret;
however, that, as they say, is the price of a free society. 62
CONCLUSION
If iDNAfication techniques could be designed and used in ways
that reduced their personal and social risks to those already borne by
manual fingerprinting, these techniques could be useful supplements
to our current means of personal identification. However, to
summarize, five conditions would have to be met before any
iDNAfication program could meet the pattern-matching standard set
by our current use of fingerprinting and photography as identification
tools:
1. To adequately protect the informational privacy rights of the
identified individuals, any iDNAfication system must be strictly
limited to noncoding DNA markers. In particular, markers that are
framed in terms of race should be avoided.
2. Any DNA samples from which iDNAfication profiles are
drawn must be typed promptly after being drawn and destroyed
promptly after typing.
3. To the extent that research on DNA typing techniques and
markers is required, independent DNA sample collections should be
developed on the basis of voluntary donations from people outside
62. Cf. Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, DNA Identification and Surveillance Creep, 21
Soc. HEALTH & ILLNESS 689 (1999) (on the problems of "surveillance creep" as growing
numbers of people have their DNA on file).
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the system, in the context of the normal regulations for human
subjects research. No open-ended research access should be allowed,
under any arrangement.
4. Because of the possible impact of widespread iDNAfication
on public attitudes, care should be taken not to reinforce subjective
and unjust racial categories in the development of background frames
of statistical reference for the system.
5. In order to preserve the rights of citizens to presumptive
innocence, no arrestee, forensic, or suspect DNA profiles should be
banked for use in subsequent investigations unless and until the DNA
source is convicted of a crime.
Accepting these conditions as prerequisites for iDNAfication
will, of course, require a substantial reform and retro-fitting of many
existing state forensic iDNAfication systems and the military's
standing collection of "DNA dogtags." It would also mean foregoing
the incorporation of any unconvicted citizens' iDNAfication profiles
into the state's searchable law enforcement databanks, even when
they are stored by the state for other humanitarian identification
purposes. In a Communication Age like ours, the maintenance of
multiple, unlinked collections of iDNAfication records may come to
be seen as inefficient and old-fashioned. But they may also become
unavoidable if we are to simultaneously exploit our genetic
individuality and keep it from individuating us unfairly.
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